

THE KALLIAS DECREE, THUCYDIDES, AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

It has become necessary to enter any discussion of the date of the Kallias decrees, *IG* i³.52, armed with apologies and justifications merely for bringing up the matter again; such is the result not so much of the quantity of articles and chapters written on the subject as of the belief that the orthodox date, 434/3, has been proved, despite reliance on circumstantial evidence and some forceful objections levied against it.¹ Indeed, that the case is considered closed can find no better reflection than the assignment of the date 434/3 in *IG* i³ without even a question mark.

As is well known, the dating of the Kallias decrees is a problem which transcends mere reconstructions of Athenian public finance of the mid to late fifth century B.C., to become an issue with much broader historical implications and consequences: although devoid of any reference to war or political events, these inscriptions, dated to 434/3, have been regarded as the chief buttress and independent confirmation of the view that the Athenians, even prior to the formation of a defensive alliance with Kerkyra in 433, had begun to prepare for a war that was not to break out for another three years.² For the decrees reveal that a decision had already been made to concentrate the sacred treasures of Athens and Attica on the Akropolis, and this is generally understood as preparation for conflict.

A further problem with the traditional date which its proponents have not, in my view, sufficiently appreciated is that if the standard date of and postulated motivation for the Kallias decrees are correct, then, as will become clear, this must affect our judgement of Thucydides' treatment of events in the few years preceding the war. However, I intend to show that it is precisely from Thucydides that the most telling case against 434/3 can be made.

These decrees, then, concerned with restricted financial and administrative matters, have been elevated to such a position of historical importance that we simply must be as certain as possible about their date, as well as about their meaning and significance. That is justification enough to reopen the question of their date.

¹ The bibliography for the standard view is too extensive to be given here. Chief among the basic works is B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, M. F. McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Quota Lists*, iii (Princeton, 1950), pp. 320, 326 (hereinafter referred to as *ATL*); R. Meiggs, D. M. Lewis, *Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford, 1969), no. 58; D. W. Bradeen, 'The Kallias Decrees Again', *GRBS* 12 (1971), 469–83; W. E. Thompson, 'Internal Evidence for the Date of the Kallias Decrees', *SO* 48 (1973), 24–45. Among the circumstantial evidence that has been used to support the standard date is, e.g. apparent reference in decree B to work on the Propylaia, which has been thought to support 434/3, because it predates the end of construction. The most notable exceptions to the traditional date have been made by H. B. Mattingly, who proposes 422/1, in a number of articles, the fullest treatment appearing in 'The Financial Decrees of Kallias (*IG* i².91/2)', *PACA* 7 (1964), 35–55, and C. W. Fornara, 'The Date of the Callias Decrees', *GRBS* 11 (1970), 185–96, who revives Beloch's date of 418/17. I will show that, although Mattingly and Fornara have highlighted many of the serious difficulties inherent in the date of 434/3, the alternatives proposed are not without problems as well.

² See, e.g., G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1972), pp. 73–4; R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford, 1972), p. 200; A. G. Woodhead, 'Before the Storm', in *Mélanges helléniques offerts à Georges Daux* (Paris, 1974), p. 382. Cf. most recently, C. Triebel-Schubert, 'Zur Datierung der Kallias-Dekrete', *Quaderni Catanesi* 12 (1984), 355–75, who would place decree A in 435, supposing preparation for war even earlier.

Most scholars concerned with the decrees of Kallias have based their dates and interpretations of the decrees' provisions on the following initial assumptions: (1) that the decrees were passed on the same day at the same assembly meeting and should be considered an interrelated unit;³ (2) that they must be dated to a Greater Panathenaic year; (3) that, however, the years 430/29 and 426/5 are excluded from consideration by the Logistai inscription, *IG* i³.369; (4) that at some time preceding the passage of these decrees the treasures of the 'other gods' were concentrated on the Akropolis.⁴ Each one of these assumptions, however, requires a closer look. The results of this investigation should, I hope, provide both a better indication of the likely date for decree A at least and a clearer understanding of its significance and content.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DECREES A AND B

(1) *General problems*

Since H. T. Wade-Gery's restoration of the prescript of decree B in 1931, scholars almost without exception have accepted the view that the decrees on the two faces of the stele were passed at the same assembly meeting on the same day.⁵ Indeed, this restoration is the fundamental basis for the view that the two decrees should be considered as a unit. D. Bradeen, accepting Wade-Gery's restoration, argued that the same mason inscribed both documents and believed therefore that 'the two decrees were inscribed at the same time as well as passed on the same day'.⁶ But if the decrees were indeed inscribed by the same hand, nevertheless this is evidence neither that they were passed on the same day, nor that they were inscribed at the same time. As Bradeen himself noted, the same mason inscribed a document in 432.⁷

Scholars have always noticed discrepancies in orthography, vocabulary, style, and content between the two decrees and, persuaded by Wade-Gery's restoration of decree B's prescript, have had to explain them away because of the belief that both decrees were passed at the same assembly meeting. Yet these discrepancies are numerous, and, although each may be minor *per se*, taken cumulatively as they should be, they do not comfortably submit to a blanket denial of their significance: they include the spelling of the dative plural ending,⁸ and the occurrence of *πόλις* in A, *ἀκρόπολις* in B.⁹

³ With the exception of W. K. Pritchett, 'Kallias: Fact or Fancy?', *CSCA* 4 (1971), 220–5, and 'The Choiseul Marble', *BCH* 101 (1977), 9–10 n. 5, who has not dealt with the date; cf. Triebel-Schubert, art. cit., who places decree A in autumn 435 and decree B in autumn/winter 434/3, but curiously does not address the arguments, both epigraphic and substantive, that have supported the traditional view that the two decrees were passed at the same time.

⁴ Only shortly before: e.g. Meiggs and Lewis, op. cit., p. 158. Some years before: Mattingly, art. cit.; Fornara, art. cit. For a different view, see T. Linders, *The Treasurers of the Other Gods in Athens and their Functions* (Meisenheim am Glan, 1975), p. 53, who, however, has no objection to 434/3.

⁵ H. T. Wade-Gery, 'The Financial Decrees of Kallias (*IG* i².91–2)', *JHS* 51 (1931), 57–85, at 59. Exception: Pritchett, art. cit. (1971).

⁶ Bradeen, art. cit. 469–70, noting that Kirchhoff in his comments on *IG* i.32 had suggested that the same mason inscribed both decrees; cf. also Pritchett, art. cit. (1971), 224–5. Wade-Gery, art. cit. 58, believed that he could distinguish between the hands on the two faces.

⁷ Art. cit. 470.

⁸ Decree A contains the newer form *αις* (lines 6, 18, 29); in decree B the older form *ασι* appears (line 21), as Wade-Gery noticed, art. cit. 58–9.

⁹ A: lines 4, 15, 21, 30; B: lines 5, 11 (partially restored), though *ἐμ πόλει* is restored in line 13.

More important are some striking observations on the Kallias decrees made recently by Sir Kenneth Dover which warrant attention: in an article whose purpose was to detect and discuss individual prose styles in inscriptions, he noted a stylistic feature apparent in decree A, namely, a 'certain liking' for the perfective aspect in periphrastic form, but not in B.¹⁰ It is surely noteworthy when one of the most perceptive readers of the Greek language finds no immediate stylistic similarity between the two documents.¹¹ If indeed the two decrees were passed on the same day at the same assembly meeting, one would reasonably expect the same persons to have been responsible for the drafting and final text of the decree,¹² and, consequently, some consistency in style.

There is a further point of difference between the two decrees which seems to me significant, but has not received due attention since it was first noticed by West.¹³ In decree A, the unspecific expression *οἱ θεοί* occurs for the recipients of the *χρήματα* owed (in lines 2, 5, 8, 16, 26, 30), while in decree B the more specific formula *οἱ ἄλλοι θεοί* is used (in lines 23, 25 [restored]).¹⁴

The use of the general term *οἱ θεοί* is unusual. In the accounts in which the treasury or treasurers of the 'other gods' is mentioned, *οἱ ἄλλοι θεοί* or *οἱ τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν ταμίαι* occurs.¹⁵ As West noted, the use of *οἱ θεοί* should precede *οἱ ἄλλοι θεοί*:¹⁶ the latter term is an expression of contrast; 'other' suggests at least one more group from which it is being distinguished. The general term *οἱ θεοί*, however, does not. The fact that decree A refers only to *οἱ θεοί* and decree B to *οἱ ἄλλοι θεοί* suggests that the decrees were passed at different times, i.e. before and after a formal distinction was made. I shall return to the significance of this point for the date of decree A.

Despite the fact that documents of this kind are hardly models of uniformity,¹⁷ there is a disturbing number of epigraphic discrepancies between the two decrees. Furthermore, they are accompanied by more serious differences in the content of the two decrees, most of which scholars have long been aware of, and which need only be mentioned briefly here. First, whereas in decree A no specific amount is given out of which the *ἀπόδοσις* to 'the Gods' is to be made, in line 22 of decree B a precise figure of 200 talents appears which had been voted for *ἀπόδοσις*. It is odd that an amount unspecified in the first decree, indeed surely unknown,¹⁸ should at this same meeting be fully determined and known in the second. Furthermore, in decree A, the

¹⁰ Lines 3-4, 5-6, 11-12, 30; K. J. Dover, 'The Language of Classical Attic Documentary Inscriptions', *Trans. Phil. Soc.* (1981), 1-14, at 7-8; cf., however, decree B, line 4, which may possibly be similar to A in this respect.

¹¹ Although he does not rule out the possibility that one might, on closer examination, detect features in the two decrees which distinguish them from other documents.

¹² Dover notes, art. cit. 1, that three individuals could have a part in the final text of a decree inscribed on stone, the proposer, the secretary (*γραμματεὺς*) and the under-secretary (*ὑπογραμματεὺς*).

¹³ A. B. West, 'The Two Callias Decrees', *AJA* 38 (1934), 390-407, at 393.

¹⁴ Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, ii.2 (Strassburg, 1916), p. 346, thought that the term *οἱ θεοί* might include Athena. It is unlikely that Athena on the Akropolis could be included since in decree A payment of money to *οἱ θεοί* is contrasted to Athena's money; certainly it could, however, have included treasures from Athena's shrines in Attica and elsewhere in Athens.

¹⁵ E.g. *IG* i³.472, lines 7-9; *IG* i³.369, lines 54-5, 77, 94 (restored), 104; *IG* i³.383 *passim*.

¹⁶ Art. cit. 393.

¹⁷ Cf. in the case of decrees A and B, inconsistency in the use of the aspirate: A, lines 4, 5, 22; B, lines 8, 27. On the aspirate, see L. Threagte, *The Grammar of Attic Inscriptions*, i (Berlin, 1980), pp. 493-4.

¹⁸ Since the *demos* cannot have known the precise amount that some of those funds would yield, nor did they know how much was owed; and the *dekate*, 'whenever it is farmed out' (line 7), has an indefinite temporal sense.

treasurers, when they are selected by lot, are to serve in the Opisthodomos with the treasurers of Athena (lines 15–16); nothing more explicit is stated. In decree B, however, the more detailed instruction appears that the treasures of the ‘Other Gods’ are to be located on the left side of the Opisthodomos, while those of Athena are to be housed on the right (lines 24–5); this distinction is absent from decree A. If the amount voted for repayment, as well as the location of the treasury of ‘the gods’, was known all along, why were these details, which were pertinent to the contents of the first decree, put in a completely separate decree? On the other hand, if these details for some reason were only learned later on in the same meeting, or contained in a separate proposal, one would expect a rider to the first decree, rather than the appearance of the relevant information in an entirely separate decree, concerned first and foremost with Athena’s money, not that of the Other Gods. The sources of the funds to be used for the repayment were designated, to be sure, but it is clear from decree A that the amount of the debt itself was at that time unknown. Indeed, no one has ever explained why two separate decrees on similar subjects, one supposedly clarifying certain details of the other, should have been proposed and passed at the same assembly meeting, rather than one longer, but comprehensive, decree.

One can of course dismiss some of the above objections on the grounds that the drafting of proposals and decrees does not seem to us to be written with a view to concision and clarity (at least to future scholars). But this will not explain away the problem of the unknown amount of the debt to ‘the Gods’ in decree A.

These problems and discrepancies between decrees A and B should alert us to the possibility that the documents are not in fact associated. They have been explained away as reflective of the inconsistency and occasional obscurity common to such documents because of the firm belief in the restoration of decree B’s prescript, which is ultimately the sole basis for connecting the two decrees. It requires, therefore, close examination.

(2) *The prescript of decree B*

Wade-Gery was led to restore in B the prescript of A because he believed (1) that the phrase *Καλλίας εἶπε* was certain, and (2) that the name Eupeithes for the epistates was inevitable. The restoration was ‘clinched... beyond reasonable doubt’ when he found that restoring the rest of the prescript of A precisely filled the preceding line.¹⁹ This appears, at first glance, persuasive. But it depends entirely on the security of his readings of the preserved line of B. How sound are they?

Neither Wade-Gery nor anyone else who has followed his restoration has published in its support a full epigraphic commentary on the preserved letter traces in line 2, based on which Wade-Gery restored the entire prescript of decree B. He did, however, supply a facsimile drawing which provides a check on his text and which may be considered the epigraphic foundation of the view that the prescript of B is identical to that of A. It is instructive to note briefly Wade-Gery’s observations on the two crucial names in the restored prescript, Eupeithes and Kallias.

In the letter spaces where Wade-Gery restored Eupeithes, printing in his text *E]υπ[ε]ιθες*, his facsimile shows the following traces: []..[]..ϷΛ. If this accurately reflects what he saw, the final epsilon and sigma were certain (thus *E]υπ[ε]ιθες*). We immediately note that only two of the eight letters contained in the name Eupeithes could, according to his facsimile, be regarded as certain, and none according to his text. Especially interesting is the lack of foundation in either the text or the facsimile

¹⁹ Art. cit. 59 n. 7.

print line 2 of the prescript of decree B as it now appears in *IG* i³ and Pritchett–Daux’s readings followed by my own observations:

A. *IG* i³.52

[ος ἐγραμμάτευε, Ε]ὐπ[ε]ίθε[ς] [ἐπεστάτε, Κ]αλλίας ἐ[π]ι[ε] 11]

B. Pritchett, *CSCA* 4 (1971), 223

[. 14] [.] Ε[. 14] ασε[. 13]

C.

[. 14] [.] Ε[. 11] . ΙΑΣΕ[. 14]

It is clear that the restoration of *Εὐπειθες* as the epistates goes well beyond the evidence of the traces on the stone, as Pritchett noted. In agreement with Pritchett and Daux, I note that (1) in space 18, the letter printed in *IG* i³ as a certain iota consists only of the lower tip of a central vertical stroke.²⁷ (2) In space 21, I saw no trace of a sigma.²⁸ In addition, however, in two places my readings conflict directly with the restoration of *Eupeithes*: (1) in space 15, the short vertical stroke that remains is probably too far to the left for an upsilon.²⁹ (2) In space 19, the circular shape that apparently led Wade-Gery to suppose the existence of a Θ seems rather to be caused by weathering and cracking.³⁰ On the other hand, I observed in this space what may be a diagonal stroke from the bottom right field of the lower half of the stoichos extending to the upper left of the lower half. If this is indeed part of a letter, it would necessarily be a sigma. The condition of the stone makes it impossible to maintain with certainty that reported traces of letters are not instead marks for which erosion, cracking and chipping are responsible. From my examination of the stone, I can distinguish only one certain letter in the spaces restored with the name of *Eupeithes*.

In the spaces where *Kallias* has been restored, I saw what may be the base and apex of a lambda in space 33 of line 2 (immediately preceding *ΙΑΣ*). In the preceding space, it was unclear whether the bottom part of a letter in the lower left edge of the stoichos was preserved, and, if so, whether it slanted to the right, as would be necessary for a lambda.³¹ Following the sigma, I discerned, with Pritchett–Daux, a certain epsilon,³² and thereafter nothing that was a clear trace of a letter. However, most

assistance. My readings are based primarily on autopsy and less so on a squeeze, which has served more to confirm (both certainties and uncertainties) than to provide further information.

²⁷ This would be compatible with tau and upsilon, as well as iota.

²⁸ The surface is badly worn; the ‘sigma’ seems to be mere discoloration; cf. Pritchett–Daux: ‘We were not positive that there was any sure trace of a sigma’, art. cit. (1971), 222. The bottom of a vertical stroke in the centre (3–4 mm) may be discernible; the line of weathering runs down from this ‘stroke’ to the next line; cf. *IG* i.32, which records a vertical stroke read by Ross.

²⁹ See Pritchett, art. cit. (1971), 223 n. 9. I am judging on the basis of the normal, central placement of the vertical bar of an upsilon, not the sole exception in line 27. The stroke is also too far left for a tau; neither is a pi probable, since the right vertical stroke should be visible, nor a kappa, as Hiller suggested, since the bottom tail should be visible. The stroke would be compatible with an iota, since the iotas often appear in the left of the stoichos, e.g. line 19, space 12, 16, 41, line 20, space 16, 21, etc. Rho may be possible.

³⁰ Hiller printed a certain omicron; Ross, the earliest known examiner of the stone, read a horizontal stroke in the lower part of the stoichos, which would be compatible with an epsilon, delta, and zeta. Pritchett reads no letter here; he notes a ‘patina’ that is ‘roughly circular’, art. cit. (1971), 222.

³¹ Pritchett and Daux saw no traces of original letters in these two spaces and doubt that the existence of ‘any trace of original letter remains’, art. cit. (1971), 222; cf. Hiller’s readings: *ΛΑΣΕΙ*. Ross read nothing in these spaces. ³² As did all editors previous to Wade-Gery.

previous editors have printed here, in space 38, a dotted iota,³³ and Pritchett discerned 'the lower part of an upright stroke in the center of the stoichos'.³⁴

Kallias, therefore, remains an attractive, although uncertain, restoration, but the remainder of the restorations as they appear in *IG* i³ must be regarded as dubious in light both of these readings and those of Pritchett-Daux.³⁵ The degree of uncertainty is such that we must be cautious even in assuming that it is part of a prescript.³⁶ Even if Kallias was the proposer of B, without the restoration of Eupheithes there is no hindrance to dating A and B to different occasions.³⁷ Neither, incidentally, does the fact that they are inscribed on the same stele indicate that they are of the same date. There is at least one good parallel for an opisthographic stele with texts of different date which, like our decrees, have similar subject matter.³⁸

A summary of the argument up to this point is in order. Wade-Gery's suggestion that decrees A and B were passed on the same date is insufficiently supported on epigraphic grounds. The sole buttress of this view, the crucial restoration of line 2 of B, is illusory. In the absence of any firm ground for assuming their immediate association, A and B must be regarded as two separate decrees of different date. This conclusion has the advantage of obviating the need to explain away a number of discrepancies between the two texts, in particular, the unknown amount of the ἀπόδοσις in A, and the οἱ θεοί/οἱ ἄλλοι θεοί distinction. The weight of contrary evidence, both epigraphic and substantive, should place the burden of proof on those who accept the synchronism of decrees A and B.

ARGUMENTS FOR 434/3

Having dissociated the decrees A and B, I shall henceforth be concerned with the date of A, which is the more significant historically, as it is closely connected with the concentration on the Akropolis of the treasures of the local gods of Athens and Attica. I shall refer to decree A also as 'the Kallias decree', since in it alone is Kallias certainly the proposer.³⁹

Three chief arguments have been held to restrict the date of both decree A and decree B to 434/3. They are, in the order in which I shall examine them, (1) that both decrees date to a Greater Panathenaic year, (2) that the inventories of Athena's treasury (*IG* i³.292, 317, 343) require a date of 434 for both decrees, and (3) that the accounts of the Logistai (*IG* i³.369) preclude consideration of any date for the decrees from 433/2 through 423/2. Let us now turn to the first of these points.

³³ Hiller seems to have read a full vertical stroke, and Ross, the lower part of one.

³⁴ Art. cit. (1971), 221.

³⁵ As well as those of the earliest reports which conflict with Wade-Gery and Meritt. These should not be ignored, since the condition of ancient stones has often deteriorated at a rate at least equalling the improvement of epigraphic techniques.

³⁶ Since the beginning of the inscription is not preserved, and proper names can of course appear in the text of a decree: cf. Pritchett, art. cit. (1971), 223 n. 9.

³⁷ If indeed the first preserved line of decree B is part of a prescript of which the preceding lost line is the beginning, nevertheless Wade-Gery's observation that the length of the prescript of both A and B is the same carries little weight, since that of A (91 spaces) is very close to the average length of prescripts of its approximate date: cf. Pritchett, art. cit. (1971), 224.

³⁸ I.e. the inscriptions concerning the Athena Nike temple and priestess, *IG* i³.35 and 36.

³⁹ Although I must necessarily consider decree B where it is relevant to the date of decree A, it is beyond the scope of this article to consider fully its date, clearly an important matter as well. For some brief comments see n. 84.

(1) *The dating of decree A to a Greater Panathenaic year*

Since, as I am arguing, the inscriptions should not be assumed to have been passed at the same time, an obvious consequence is that internal dating evidence contained in one of the decrees cannot now be applied to the other. This has immediate bearing on the view that decree A, as well as B, should date to a Greater Panathenaic year. The argument is based on the appearance in line 27 of decree B of a formula which is characteristic of decrees in Greater Panathenaic years.⁴⁰ There is also a reference in decree A (lines 27–8) to the Panathenaic period, but only to indicate the times at which the new tamiai should give their accounts; it therefore reveals nothing about the date of the decree itself. If, however, the temporal indication of decree B is irrelevant to decree A, there is no longer any compulsion whatsoever to date decree A to a year of the Greater Panathenaia. This, therefore, considerably widens the possible candidates for the date of decree A: theoretically, we are no longer restricted to 434/3, 422/1, and 418/7, the only years which have come under serious consideration.

(2) *The temporal relationship between decrees A and B, and the inventories of Athena*

Decree B has been understood to order the publication of inventories of Athena's treasury. Since these inventories appear to begin in 434/3 (*IG* i³.292, 317, 343), then *a priori* the date of decree B should be 434/3. If, as is usually thought, decree B should not precede decree A, then decree A itself should date no later than 434/3.

I agree that decree A should precede decree B, in my view for the following reasons: in B, the treasury of οἱ ἄλλοι θεοί and its treasurers have already been established, or, at least, previously arranged provisions for their establishment are implied. In A, however, neither has the treasury yet been created, nor the board of ταμίαι τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν. Indeed, the phrase οἱ ἄλλοι θεοί had not yet come into use in place of the general phrase οἱ θεοί.⁴¹

The next question, therefore, is whether decree B does in fact provide for the institution of inventories of Athena. Let us first examine the relevant lines in decree B:

26 [ἡπόσα δὲ τῶν χρημάτων τῶν [ἱερῶν] ἄστατά ἐστιν ἐ ἀν[αριθμετα ἡ]-
 27 [οἱ ταμίαι] ἡ[ο]ι νῦν μετὰ τῶν τε[ττάρω]ν ἀρχόν[ων] καὶ ἐδίδω[σαν] τὸν λόγ]-
 28 [ον τὸν ἐκ Πα]ναθηναίων ἐς Πα[ναθ]ένα[ια] ἡπόσα μέγ[ιστη] χρυ[σά] ἐστιν αὐ]-
 29 [τὸν ἐ ἀργυρά] ἐ ὑπάργυρα στε[σάντων], τὰ δ[ὲ] ἄλλ[α] ἀριθμεσάντων ...]
 30 -----

Several points need to be addressed. In line 27, reference is made to the four previous annual boards of ταμίαι 'who gave their accounts from Panathenaia to Panathenaia'. In other words, inventories had been kept for at least four years prior to decree B. Mention also occurs in the first extant inventories of Athena, dated to 434/3, of the previous four ἀρχαί who submitted their accounts to the board of 434/3. If one dates decree B to 434/3, one must therefore suppose that the decree provides not for the *institution* of inventories, but for a new procedure which accords with the extant inventories beginning in 434/3. Yet the procedure described in decree B, lines 26ff.,

⁴⁰ On the connection between this formula and Greater Panathenaic years, see most recently, R. Develin, 'From Panathenaia to Panathenaia', *ZPE* 57 (1984), 133–8; cf. P. Gauthier's comments on Develin's arguments in *REG* 100 (1987), 317–18. ⁴¹ See above, p. 96.

seems not to consist of guidelines and directives for the present and future, but rather of specific instructions for a particular situation. Decree A provides an example of the kind of phraseology used for the institution of a new procedure. In lines 24-5 the phrases *καὶ τὸ λοιπόν* and *hoi aiei tamiai* make clear the implementation of a consistent and permanent arrangement (for the board of *ταμίαι τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν*). In contrast, the arrangements of decree B, lines 26ff., appear rather to be applied only to the present: the current (*νῦν*, not *αἰεί*) treasurers and the previous four boards should now count and weigh as much of the sacred money as is still unweighed and uncounted. This sounds to me very much like unfinished business, a one-time 'clean-up' of a backlog. There is no sign here of the institution for the future of a new accounting *procedure*, and we simply cannot try to save the hypothesis by assuming that, in the lost part of the inscription which follows line 29, such a procedure was detailed. The beginning of our extant accounts of Athena's treasury should not necessarily be associated with decree B.⁴²

Therefore, this argument fails to pin decree B to 434/3. Mention of the preceding four boards who themselves kept inventories could easily fit 430/29, for example, and the situation alluded to in lines 26ff. could be accounted for by general confusion and an administrative backlog at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.

(3) *The report of the Logistai*, IG i³.369

Now we must turn to the chief reason why the years 430/29 and 426/5, both Greater Panathenaic years, have not been considered as possible dates, and why, even if we do not exclude non-Greater Panathenaic years, any year between 433 and 422 has been considered impossible.

The stumbling-block has been the Logistai inscription (IG i³.369), which records loans contracted from the sacred treasuries from 426–423, and totals of previous loans within the period 433–426. Wade-Gery 'rule[d] out absolutely any date inside these eleven years for Kallias' decrees', and Meritt found it necessary to reiterate the point in 1982: 'the comparative evidence of D1 [Kallias decree A] and the Logistai inscription does in fact permit no date other than 434/3'.⁴³

Wade-Gery believed that the Logistai inscription demonstrated that no repayment, such as that directed in the Kallias decree, could have been made within the period 433/2 through 423/2. His stated reason is that the report of the Logistai 'gives the total of all loans contracted in the eleven years 433–422, with the interest in each case from the date of borrowing to 10 Hekatombaion 422. It follows that no payment has been made by the borrowing party during this time; the debt has been running continuously, and interest accumulating, for eleven years'.⁴⁴

His conclusion, however, does not follow. The Logistai account does indeed show that no repayment of the debts outstanding in 426 was made throughout the quadrennium 426–422, for the sum of the previous seven-year debt was made the basis for interest calculations in 422 for the preceding four-year term (lines 102–5). But for the period 433/2–427/6 we are given only the sum of the outstanding debt at the end of that term, a little over 766 talents. Therefore we have no idea of annual fluctuations of the amount owed within that period (433–426), possessing as we do *only* the end result in 426. The Logistai account is therefore not a comprehensive record of all loan activity from the year 433 to 426. Accordingly a repayment *τοῖς*

⁴² Wade-Gery, art. cit. 77, attractively supposed that the opening of the Parthenon for use could explain the beginning of these accounts in 434/3.

⁴³ Wade-Gery, art. cit. 69; B. D. Meritt, 'Thucydides and the Decrees of Kallias', *Hesperia* Suppl. 19 (1982), 112–21, at 112.

⁴⁴ Art. cit. 69.

θεοῖς (of unknown amount) directed in Kallias decree A could well have been made during these years.⁴⁵

References in the inscription to the seven-year outstanding debt from 433 to 426⁴⁶ might lead one to suppose, as apparently did Wade-Gery, that the debt had been running continuously from 433. Yet it bears reminding that the totals of loans from all the sacred treasuries (those of the Other Gods, Athena Polias, Athena Nike, and Hermes) originate in 433.⁴⁷ 433 was simply the beginning of a *period* of reckoning all debts to the sacred treasuries. It was not necessarily the date on which all the loans from each of the sacred treasuries within this period began. But even if money was borrowed from the Other Gods in 433, nothing rules out the repayment of such a debt in a subsequent year, followed in turn by new loans thereafter, building up to a total amount in 426 of some 766 talents. Once again, annual fluctuations from the period 433 to 426 would not show up in the Logistai inscription.

The result is that the Logistai inscription presents an obstacle possibly to the years 426/5–423/2,⁴⁸ but *not* to 433/2–427/6, as possible candidates for the date of the Kallias decree. In fact, it may not be relevant at all. The money to be repaid to ‘the gods’ in decree A, line 3 (τὰ ὀφειλόμενα χρέματα), is generally assumed to refer to borrowed funds that are now to be repaid. But W. Bannier, in 1926, suggested an alternative: he took the phrase to refer to money that was due, or owed, but not borrowed.⁴⁹

Indeed there are sufficient parallels, both literary and epigraphic, to confirm that this is another possible translation.⁵⁰ For example, of the literary examples, Xenophon uses the verb ὀφείλω in this sense a number of times, e.g. ...καὶ ὄρκους ἔδοσαν καὶ ἔλαβον παρὰ Φαρναβάζου ὑποτελεῖν τὸν φόρον Καλχηδονίου Ἀθηναίου

⁴⁵ I am referring solely to the ἀπόδοσις to ‘the Gods’ and not to the 3000 talents of Athena ‘brought up to the Akropolis’, a phrase which has generated some controversy over the meaning of ἀνεένγται. Cf. E. Meyer, *Forschungen zur alten Geschichte* 2 (Halle, 1899), pp. 104–5; W. Kolbe, *Thukydides im Licht der Urkunden* (Stuttgart, 1930), p. 69; W. Bannier, ‘Zu den Beschlüssen IGⁱ91/92’, *RhM* 75 (1926), 184–202, at 186, who argued that the phrase ἀναφέρειν εἰς πόλιν applied to a grant rather than a repayment. Subsequent discussion has tended to support the notion of a freely given grant, or transfer of money, cf. A. W. Gomme, ‘Thucydides ii 13, 3’, *Historia* 2 (1953–4), 1–21, at 12–21; *Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, ii (Oxford, 1956), pp. 26–33 (hereinafter *HCT*); Bradeen, art. cit. 478–9. Mattingly, who argued in 1964 (art. cit. 43) that the phrase referred to repayment of a debt, changed his position in 1974 (‘The Mysterious 3000 Talents of the First Kallias Decree’, *GRBS* 16 [1975], 15–22, at 18), noting that ‘transfer’ is a better translation [of ἀναφέρειν] than either ‘give’ or ‘repay’; cf. also *ATL* iii.281 and 327–8. In Kallias’ decree, the 3000 talents are contrasted with the ἀπόδοσις to ‘the Gods’, rather than being part of an overall repayment procedure. Incidentally, it is important to remember that the existence of loans contracted by the state at a certain period does not necessarily imply the absence of available funds; cf. for example the situation noted by Wade-Gery, ‘The Year of the Armistice, 423 B.C.’, *CQ* 24 (1930), 33–9, at 38, in which the state took out a loan for a military expedition just after the Dionysia although the Hellenotamiai had just received the year’s tribute, and W. S. Ferguson, *The Treasurers of Athena* (Cambridge, Mass., 1932), pp. 153, 162–3. But cf. Gomme, *HCT* ii.433, who surmised that the Hellenotamiai might have handed over each year’s surplus to Athena, which would have comprised the difference between the tribute total and the amount reserved for routine and predictable expenses, e.g. maintenance of the fleet, etc. This is the hypothesis which the editors of *ATL* and others adopt for the years 449–434, whereby in each of those years the Hellenotamiai handed over to Athena a sum of 200 talents, representing the average annual surplus (*ATL* iii.326–8).

⁴⁶ Lines 103–5; cf. also ‘eleven years’ (counting from 422), lines 119–20.

⁴⁷ Athena Polias: lines 98–9, 114–15; the ‘other gods’: lines 102–3, 119–23; Athena Nike: lines 106–7, 112–13; Hermes: lines 109–10.

⁴⁸ Since in each of those years, the Logistai present an annual account of loan activity and one might expect some indication were a loan repaid in the course of an annual term.

⁴⁹ Art. cit. 185.

⁵⁰ Bannier, art. cit. 184–5, lists a few of these parallels.

ὅσονπερ εἰώθεσαν καὶ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα χρήματα ἀποδοῦναι Ἀθηναίους δὲ μὴ πολεμῖν Καλχηδονίους... (*Hell.* 1.3.9); ἀργύριον δὲ ποτέρως ἂν πλεόν ἀναλωθείη, εἰ τούτοις τὸ ὀφειλόμενον ἀποδοθείη, ἢ εἰ ταῦτα τε ὀφείλονται ἄλλους τε κρείττονας δέοι σεμισθοῦσθαι (*Anab.* 7.7.34).⁵¹ Of the epigraphical evidence, many of the uses of the verb ὀφείλω concern tribute that is due, or fines, where clearly repayment of borrowed money is not at issue, but simply payment of what is owed, for example, in the inscription concerning Athenian relations with Methone: [... τὸν δὲ ὀφ] | [εἰ]λεμάτων ἡὰ γεγράφαι τῷ δημοσίῳ τ[ὸν ἀπειτε] | [μέ]νον Μεθοναῖοι ὀφείλοντες (*IG* i³.61, lines 9–11; cf. also line 14); the decree of Kleinias: ἡ[ό]σοι δὲ τὸν ἀπα[γ] | [όντων] Ἀθέναζε ἐς τὸ πινάκιον ἀν[α]γεγράφαι ὀφέ | [λοντες ἐν τῷ βολέι... (*IG* i³.34, lines 58–60; cf. lines 66, 72).⁵²

The translation, therefore, of τὰ ὀφειλόμενα χρήματα to mean ‘money due as an obligation’ but not the repayment of a loan is certainly possible. But the main question is whether the circumstances one must imagine to explain it are likely, and here we are faced with a lamentable paucity of evidence.⁵³ Indeed, the uncertainty of the evidence has led to markedly different views on the degree to which the Athenian state bore any financial obligation to local cults. T. Linders, for example, argues that the state supported many local shrines in a variety of ways;⁵⁴ on the other side, D. Whitehead has argued that, while demes were sometimes obliged to contribute financially to state cults, the state ‘does not reciprocate’.⁵⁵ Due to the absence of direct evidence, but also to the lack of much clear epigraphic evidence attesting to the sources of cult financing, one should not place much weight on the alternative translation of τὰ ὀφειλόμενα χρήματα, but perhaps one should not reject it out of hand either, until more evidence appears with which to support or discount it.⁵⁶ If, however, this translation is possible, Kallias decree A may be not at all concerned with repayment of borrowed funds but rather with the resumption of payments of owed money, in which case the Logistai inscription would become utterly irrelevant to the discussion: each would deal with an entirely different kind of financial transaction.⁵⁷

⁵¹ Cf. also *Hell.* 1.5.7; 2.1.12; *Anab.* 1.2.11; 7.7.74; Suidas, s.v. ἐκλογεῖς: οἱ ἐκλέγοντες καὶ εἰσπράττοντες τὰ ὀφειλόμενα τῷ δημοσίῳ.

⁵² Cf. also *IG* i³.37, lines 25–6; *IG* i³.68, lines 16–17 (partially restored), 21–4 (almost entirely restored); *IG* i³.71, lines 10–11, 29 (partially restored); *IG* i³.99, line 9; *ATL* ii D15, lines 25–6 (partly restored); D7, lines 48 (restored), 71–2 (restored); i.579 (T69) section 9 (restored); Tod 154, line 16; 156, lines 16–17. The use of ὀφείλω for fines is exceedingly common, as in, e.g., *IG* ii².809, line 70.

⁵³ It is, however, worth keeping in mind that neither is there direct evidence for the state borrowing from the ‘other gods’ before 433 B.C., on the usual interpretation of Kallias decree A. Naturally it is easy to accept the latter situation in view of the later evidence that attests it.

⁵⁴ Linders, op. cit., pp. 12–16 with notes; cf. B. Haussoullier, *La vie municipale en Attique* (Paris, 1884), pp. 35–73, who mentions in particular state support of the Amarysia, but without a clear ancient source. An argument against the belief that, in general, the local shrines were disconnected from the state until the time of the Kallias decree is the unlikelihood that the state would have been in a position to borrow money from the local gods at all were they completely separate.

⁵⁵ D. Whitehead, *The Demes of Attica* (Princeton, 1986), pp. 179–80; cf. also Ferguson, op. cit., p. 162 n. 2.

⁵⁶ The alternative, that of simply money due to the gods, not repayment of a loan, might make better sense of the fact that nowhere in decree A is there reference to interest (τόκος) to be calculated on the amount borrowed, which occurs regularly in connection with loans, e.g. in *IG* i³.369, *passim*.

⁵⁷ Wade-Gery, art. cit. (1931), 69 n. 50, seemed not to be aware of this in his objections to Bannier’s proposed date for the Kallias decrees, 431.

However we are to understand the reference to τὰ ὀφελόμενα χρήματα in decree A, it bears repeating in conclusion that the Logistai inscription does not exclude consideration of the period 433–426 for the date of the Kallias decree.

The result of the entire argument of this section is to open considerably the field of candidates for the date of decree A. We may now begin to narrow down the possibilities.

THE CONCENTRATION OF THE LOCAL SACRED TREASURES AND THE KALLIAS DECREE

First, it is important to determine as thoroughly as possible whether the local treasures had been centralized, even if only recently, by the time the Kallias decree was passed, as the answer has direct bearing on its date. For we know that the treasures of the Other Gods had been concentrated on the Akropolis by 429, and possibly by 430.⁵⁸ That they had recently been centralized seems to be the view of Meiggs and Lewis, who, along with the other proponents of 434/3 for the date of the Kallias decree, suppose that it institutes a permanent board of treasurers of the Other Gods.⁵⁹ That the treasures had been concentrated years before is necessarily the position of Mattingly and Fornara, both of whom believe that this happened at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, but that the Kallias decree, dating much later, in 422 or 418 respectively, calls for the reorganization of an already existing board of treasurers of the Other Gods. Only Bradeen, to my knowledge, has stated unequivocally that the treasures had not yet been concentrated by the time of the Kallias decree.⁶⁰

A close examination of both lines 9–13 and lines 18–22 of the inscription, however, makes it extremely difficult to accept the premise that a reorganization of an already existing board is at issue, and highly unlikely that the treasures were yet on the Akropolis. Let us look first at lines 18–22:

- 18 παρὰ δὲ τῶν νῦν ταμιῶν καὶ τὸν ἐπισ-
 19 τατὸν καὶ τὸν hieropoion τὸν ἐν τοῖς hieroîs, hoî νῦν διαχειρίζ[ου]-
 20 ν, ἀπαριθμεσάσθων καὶ ἀποστεσάσθων τὰ χρήματα ἐναντίον τῆς βολ[ε]-
 21 ς ἐμ πόλει καὶ παραδεχσάσθων hoî tamíai hoî laχόντες παρὰ τὸν νῦν[
 22 ἀρχόντων...

The crucial phrase is ἐν τοῖς hieroîs, which, together with the verbs διαχειρίζουσιν, ἀπαριθμεσάσθων, and ἀποστεσάσθων, all of which must have χρήματα as their object, presents a serious obstacle: the newly selected tamiai, when they enter office, are to receive the χρήματα from the tamiai, epistatai, and hieropoioi in the shrines who at that point have charge of them, and then count and weigh the money in front of the boule. What shrines are these? It is difficult to see how they could be other than the local sanctuaries of the gods scattered throughout the city of Athens and Attica.⁶¹

⁵⁸ The extant inventories of the Other Gods, *IG* i³.383, begin in 429 and look back to previous officials in control of the funds of the Other Gods: τὰδε παρέδ[οσαν παραδεχσάμενοι] παρὰ τὸν π[ροτέρων] ταμιῶν οἷς...], lines 9–10. If these are also ταμίαι τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν, then on the basis of the extant evidence, we should date the creation of this board of treasurers to 430.

⁵⁹ Op. cit., p. 158.

⁶⁰ Art. cit. 471 n. 14.

⁶¹ It is also difficult to see how hoî νῦν ἀρχόντες in lines 21–2 could be a different board from hoî νῦν ταμίαι καὶ hoî ἐπιστάται καὶ hoî hieropoioî of lines 18–19, or that they are not local officials, *contra*, e.g., Mattingly, 'Athenian Finance in the Peloponnesian War', *BCH* 92 (1968), 450–85, at 458–60, following Beloch, op. cit., p. 347, according to whom the tamiai of line 18 would be the present board of tamiai on the Akropolis. Cf. Meritt, 'The Second Athenian

It seems to me that these lines warrant one of the following two conclusions: (1) the local officials still have possession of their sacred treasure, which is still in the local shrines, and is now directed to be placed on the Akropolis, or (2) the local officials still have possession of their local treasure but they have already brought it up to the Akropolis where they have been overseeing it until it can be weighed, counted, and centralized. In favour of the first possibility is the phrase *ἐν τοῖς hieroῖs*, which strongly suggests that the temple officials, and necessarily therefore the treasures which they control (*hoi nūn διαχειρίζο[σι]ν*), are still in their various shrines. On the other hand, if this is so, then the decree lacks an explicit instruction to bring the local treasures to the Akropolis, although the decree does specify the final location *ἐμ πόλει* in line 21, which may have been sufficient. This difficulty could be avoided by adopting the second possible interpretation, namely that the treasures are actually on the Akropolis, overseen by their local officials. In this case it is not difficult to imagine the result of hundreds of officials guarding their local treasures in the same place; it is a scene almost evoking comedy, but in reality one which surely would have necessitated the immediate arrangement of a smaller permanent board of treasurers for the moneys and a procedure for centralizing them. For even if the treasures had already been brought up to the Akropolis, the Kallias decree seems decisive against the idea that they had already been centralized properly, and by that I mean counted, weighed, and stored in one place, overseen by one board of officials. But this alternative, while satisfying one possible objection to the other, faces the perhaps greater problem of defying the natural meaning of *ἐν τοῖς hieroῖs*.

First, it is methodologically more sound to adhere to the straightforward interpretation of *ἐν τοῖς hieroῖs* than to distort it for the sake of an argument from silence in a text that is far from self-explanatory. Further close consideration of its provisions makes it clear that the first alternative is the better one, and therefore that the treasures had not yet been concentrated at the time of decree A.

Our first step is to consider precisely what funds the future tamiai were to administer in the Opisthodomos. The beginning of the decree is concerned with owed funds, *τὰ ὀφελόμενα χρέματα* (line 3), but it is not entirely clear whether the new tamiai are to manage these funds alone. Until line 16, the decree mentions *only* the money owed, and to be repaid. In line 14, the precise *[το]ῦτον τὸν χρεμάτων* is used: the treasurers are to be selected 'for this money', that is, at this point, still the owed money alone. Then follows the instruction that the tamiai are to be treasurers of *τὰ θεῶν χρέματα* on the Akropolis in the Opisthodomos (line 16). Are these *χρέματα* still just the owed funds, as previously?⁶² Further references to the money are not specific (to us); it is less clear precisely what money is being mentioned than in the earlier part of the decree. We would, perhaps, expect to have a more positive indication if now (line 16) general funds of the gods were at issue, but we should probably not be surprised at its apparent absence. It is in any case clear that some previous decisions (and decrees) precede this decree, which seems to be, in some ways, an elaboration and sequel.⁶³ It makes most sense to suppose that the reference of *χρέματα* broadens

Tribute Assessment Period', *GRBS* 8 (1967), 130, who supposes that the officials of line 18 are the local officials but does not consider the implications of this view. The alternative proposed by Linders, *op. cit.*, pp. 49–50, that 'the present treasurers' might have been a temporary commission which disbursed the funds that had originally been borrowed from the 'other gods' seems unnecessarily complicated, and, further, it is not at all clear that 'some authority must during this time [when the money was initially borrowed from the temples around Attica] have made the disbursements'.

⁶² As is Linders' view, *op. cit.*, pp. 11, 48.

⁶³ For example, prior to decree A, there must have been a vote in the assembly to specify the funds out of which the gods would be paid; the terms used in this decree are hardly adequate

considerably to include the treasure of the gods in general. The strongest indication is provided by the instruction to weigh as well as count the *χρέματα* after it has been brought to the Akropolis (line 20). In contrast, the *χρέματα* to be repaid in the beginning of the decree (lines 3–7) are surely all coined money, which requires not weighing but counting.

This has an important consequence. Through line 15, the decree has been concerned specifically with money for the debt, and at the end of the section the eventual recipients of these funds are named, i.e. the treasurers who will be selected by lot at the appropriate time. Then we are informed that these treasurers on the Akropolis will administer the (general) funds of 'the gods' as well. In other words, after they take office, the new treasurers will receive from the local shrines not only τὰ ὀφελόμενα χρέματα, but all the *χρέματα*. This decree is therefore the measure which prescribes the procedure for concentrating the gods' property onto the Akropolis.⁶⁴

The chief outlines of the procedure, from repayment of the gods to the centralization of the treasures, can be extracted. Initially, after the precise amount owed to the gods has been calculated by the Logistai, the prytaneis, together with the boule, pay the money, cancelling the record of each debt as it is paid (lines 9–13).⁶⁵ It is at a subsequent stage, though, that the transfer ordered in lines 18–22 occurs. In this case, the treasurers who will be selected by lot are to receive the money from the tamiai, epistatai, and hieropoioi in the local shrines, and count and measure it in the presence of the boule. If this were identical to the payment envisioned in the earlier part of the decree, then we would expect and need to find mention of the prytaneis' role in this procedure as well. Furthermore, the source of the funds from which payment is to be made would have to be identical in both cases, which would mean that the tamiai, epistatai, and hieropoioi in the shrines (lines 18–19) would be those in charge of the money which had been voted for payment or repayment to the gods and is specified in lines 6–7. This is clearly not the case. Accordingly we should suppose that two stages are envisaged.

It is noteworthy that with all the explicit instructions in the decree, we are not informed as to who is to *receive* the funds to be paid in the first stage; for that reason, one can only imagine that they are to be paid to the local home of the god to whom they belong. In further support is the fact that the elections for the new treasurers are to be held some time in the future, while there is no indication that some of the payment is not to begin as soon as possible.⁶⁶

We can state positively, then, in view of lines 18–22, in which the local officials have control of the funds at the time when the decree was passed, and the fact that the decree evidently gives the procedure for the transfer to the Akropolis of the local treasures, that the treasures of the gods and goddesses of Athens and Attica had not yet been brought to the Akropolis. This accords neatly with the use of οἱ θεοί in decree A in place of the expression οἱ ἄλλοι θεοί as in B and other references to the treasury of the Other Gods. The impetus for adding the distinction ἄλλοι was most likely the need, after decree A, to distinguish a consolidated treasury on the Akropolis of gods

by themselves as a specification, especially those in lines 6–7 (καὶ τὰλλα ἃ ἐστὶ τούτων [τό]ν χρεμάτων...).

⁶⁴ As Bradeen thought, art. cit. 471 n. 14.

⁶⁵ The ἐπειδὴν in lines 10–11, as well as in line 30, may suggest a continuing process and not a single action. I agree with Fornara, art. cit. 194 n. 25, and Linders, op. cit., pp. 40–1, and others, that the vouchers are to corroborate, not to establish the debt.

⁶⁶ It is also clear that it will continue into the future: καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς δεκάτης ἐπειδὴν πραθεῖ (line 7).

other than Athena Polias, Athena Nike, and Hermes, or perhaps simply from Athena Polias in the Opisthodomos.

We can thus effectively exclude any date later than 429, and therefore Mattingly's and Fornara's candidates, 422 and 418, since, as previously mentioned, the treasures of the Other Gods had been concentrated since 429 at least.

THE DATE OF DECREE A AND THUCYDIDES

Now at last we can begin to close in on a specific date for decree A. To begin, let us recall briefly our findings thus far. None of the arguments which have been held to confine the decree to (a) a Greater Panathenaic year, (b) on or before 434, or (c) before 433 or after 422, is persuasive. On the other hand, decree A should be placed at a time before the treasury of the 'other gods' is known to have existed. We have therefore a *terminus ante quem* of 429 or possibly 430; it remains to judge on the basis of other evidence which date before then is most probable. 434 is, therefore, still a possibility; but does it have anything to recommend it?

The standard hypothesis to explain the decision to concentrate the treasures is that only an imminent war which threatened their safety would have resulted in such an action. Although this hypothesis is not necessarily correct (for example, a purely administrative decision of convenience may have prompted their concentration) it seems not unlikely. The local sanctuaries of the gods in Attica were under the control of their respective demes. While the state could lend assistance of various kinds, these temples and shrines could not be said to be 'state-controlled'. It is difficult to believe that the sacred possessions of the gods could have been moved from their traditional homes, inevitably upsetting to some degree religious observance and custom, without strong reason. It is not clear that convenience alone was a sufficient motive.

As the traditional hypothesis that the treasures were concentrated as a safety measure due to threat of war is integral to the case of 434, let us accept it for the sake of argument, at the same time noting clearly that it is only a hypothesis. In order to accept 434 as the date of the Kallias decree, then, one must demonstrate that the Athenians in that year were so convinced that war was at their doorstep that they were likely to make drastic preparations. Proponents of this view find chief support in a comment by Thucydides in 1.44.2, introducing the reasons for the Athenians' decision to form a defensive alliance with Kerkyra in 433: ἐδόκει γὰρ ὁ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους πόλεμος καὶ ὥς ἔσεσθαι αὐτοῖς.

This passage has occasioned much debate and has been used to support arguments about the inevitability of the Peloponnesian war.⁶⁷ Further support is believed to come from a remark of Perikles preserved by Plutarch (*Per.* 8.5): καὶ τὸ τὸν πόλεμον ἤδη φάναι καθορᾶν ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου προσφερόμενον. Andrewes is right to point out that, for the comment to be remembered, it was probably made when the idea of a war with Sparta was not so obvious.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, it is an undated remark, wholly out of its original context, and cannot therefore be used as evidence that by 434 the Athenians considered war so likely and imminent that they began to prepare for it.

But can Thuc. 1.44.2 bear the weight placed upon it in order to support such an important inference? It is essential to emphasize the obvious difference between

⁶⁷ Cf. e.g. J. de Romilly, *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism*, trans. P. Thody (Oxford, 1963), p. 25; D. Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, 1969), esp. pp. 241–2.

⁶⁸ A. Andrewes, 'Thucydides on the Causes of the War', *CQ* 9 (1959), 223–39, at 236.

thinking that something may occur at some point, and taking decisive action to prepare for it.⁶⁹ Some or all of the Athenians in 433 may well have thought that at some point war with the Peloponnesians would probably occur; this at least is what Thucydides states. However, a closer look at the broader context shows that the Athenians were not yet at the stage of preparing actively for imminent conflict.⁷⁰ Had they been so, we should expect that they would have made overtures to Kerkyra, rather than the other way around. Kerkyra possessed the largest navy in Greece after the Athenians' (Thuc. 1.33.2), and, if the Corinthians prevailed in the current hostilities, the Peloponnesians stood to add this fleet to their own to create a formidable challenge to Athenian naval superiority, as the Kerkyraians themselves point out in their peroration (1.36.3). And yet, the Athenians were quite hesitant about the decision to ally with Kerkyra: although the Kerkyraians themselves asserted that war with Sparta would occur (1.33.3), the Athenians turned down the proposed alliance on the first day of the assembly. This behaviour is hardly consistent with the idea that the Athenians had begun serious preparation for war by taking complicated and comprehensive measures to centralize the financial resources of Attica.⁷¹

Furthermore, in the very passage in which Thucydides mentions the belief that war was coming, he also clearly implies that it was not expected immediately or in the very near future, since the considerations provided in 1.44.2 include the hope that Corinth and Kerkyra would gradually wear each other out.⁷² This would presumably take some time: although Kerkyra had the larger navy and great wealth, nevertheless the struggle, now two years old, had been indecisive, and Corinth had exerted tremendous effort to improve her maritime strength. It is also worth remembering that the Athenians viewed the possibility of a Spartan invasion remote even in summer 431, after the war had begun (2.21). This makes the idea of their guarding against such an attack on Attica even before war was actually declared difficult to accept. Again one must emphasize the difference between thought and action.

Doubtless as early as 433 there was concern about the likelihood of eventual war with Sparta. But Thucydides' account of the Athenian acceptance of alliance with the Kerkyraians simply does not prove that Athens in 434/3 had already reached the stage of taking major steps to prepare for war with Sparta.

There is, however, further reason to reject the date of 434 for decree A. Thucydides 2.13.3–5, in my view, provides strong testimony, the significance of which has hitherto been discounted by proponents of 434, that the treasures of the local gods had not yet been concentrated as of early summer 431.⁷³ I give the parts of the text most relevant to our investigation:

θαρσεῖν τε ἐκέλευε [Περικλῆς] ... ὑπαρχόντων δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει ἔτι τότε ἀργυρίου ἐπισήμου ἑξακισχιλίων ταλάντων ..., χωρὶς δὲ χρυσίου ἀσήμου καὶ ἀργυρίου ἐν τε ἀναθήμασιν ἰδίῳις καὶ

⁶⁹ As Fornara points out, art. cit. 188.

⁷⁰ As R. Sealey has observed, 'the remarkable feature of the comment [1.44.2] is that the preceding narrative of events scarcely justifies it' ('The Causes of the Peloponnesian War', *CP* 70 [1975], 89–109, at 98).

⁷¹ One might escape this objection by dating the Kallias Decrees to 434/3 but *after* the Kerkyraian debate on the assumption that the Athenians then realized the likely consequences of alliance with Kerkyra. However, not only does this result in an extremely tight chronological framework for the change in attitude and policy which it would imply, but for reasons which shall become clear I find any date in 434/3 unlikely.

⁷² *ἐνγκρούειν δὲ ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλοις, ἵνα ἀσθενεστέροις οὖσιν...* (1.44.2).

⁷³ Mattingly in 1968, art. cit. 456, well brought out the importance of this passage for the question of the date of the Kallias decree, yet his arguments have largely gone ignored.

δημοσίοις καὶ ὅσα ἱερὰ σκεύη περί τε τὰς πομπὰς καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ σκύλα Μηδικὰ καὶ εἴ τι τοιούτοτροπον, οὐκ ἐλάσσονος [ἤν] ἢ πεντακοσίων ταλάντων. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἱερῶν προσετίθει χρήματα οὐκ ὀλίγα, οἷς χρήσεσθαι αὐτοὺς... (2.13.3–5)

Perikles begins his reassurance to the Athenians about the state of their financial resources with reference to income, then he turns to the sacred treasures. If the date for decree A were 434, then reference to what is ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει will have included both the treasury of Athena and that of the 'other gods'; further on in the passage, however, Perikles mentions the resources 'from the other temples' (τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἱερῶν χρήματα, 13.5), in contrast to what was on the Akropolis. The reserve listed in 13.3–4 introduced by the participle ὑπαρχόντων is dependent on θαρσεῖν ἐκέλευε in 13.3; 13.5, however, begins a new sentence. This suggests to me that Perikles is no longer referring to the sacred treasures on the Akropolis; he has shifted focus from the greatest source of money, that which is on the Akropolis, to funds not on the Akropolis and of lesser value.⁷⁴ Gomme, accepting the standard dating of the Kallias decrees, characteristically noted the difficulty: 'if Thucydides is being strictly accurate, it [the treasures of the "other gods"] should therefore have been already included in the moneys on the Akropolis in 13.3'.⁷⁵ Thucydides' narrative is clear enough; the historian is drawing a distinction between what was on the Akropolis and what was in other shrines, presumably those around Attica, yet Gomme could not reconcile the apparent inconsistency with the standard date. However, there is no inconsistency if one supposes that the treasures in the shrines of the local gods had not yet been brought to the Akropolis when Perikles delivered his speech.

A further point may be added in support. Perikles provides specific total figures for the cash reserve on the Akropolis. Yet for the money ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἱερῶν, no figure is given, only the vague and general οὐκ ὀλίγα χρήματα. This contrasts sharply with the degree of specificity which Perikles exhibits throughout the rest of 2.13; indeed, even where he does not supply a total amount, he details the type and extent of reserve available. Had the treasures been concentrated in 434/3, exact figures would have been available, as Mattingly noted,⁷⁶ and they would only have strengthened Perikles' argument about the magnitude of Athens' financial resources. This distinction between the specific, defined figures provided for money on the Akropolis, and the imprecise phrase οὐκ ὀλίγα given for τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἱερῶν χρήματα is, I believe, significant, and implies that the local sacred treasures had not yet been concentrated.⁷⁷

Thucydides 2.13.3–5 is, in my view, decisive against a date of 434, and indeed any date prior to summer 431, for decree A.⁷⁸ Indeed summer 431 (probably not long after

⁷⁴ Perikles ends his account of Athens' financial resources with mention of the gold plates from the statue of Athena on the Akropolis, but it is clear that he has now moved on to consider the resources available in a 'worst-case' scenario, and therefore it does not affect his previous distinction between what is on the Akropolis and what is not.

⁷⁵ *HCT* ii, loc. cit.

⁷⁶ *Art. cit.* (1968), 456.

⁷⁷ Cf. *ATL* iii.333, whose editors agree that the temples mentioned in this passage are local, but suppose that their treasures were never concentrated, e.g., such as Rhamnous. But there is no evidence that the state ever used, or was in any easy position to use, the money from the temples to which they suggest 2.13.5 refers; cf. Linders, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁷⁸ An additional point, admittedly indecisive but worth making, is that the historian dwells in 2.16 on the reluctance of the Athenians to forsake their hereditary temples, after Perikles urged the residents of Athens and Attica to evacuate the countryside and move within the city walls; he seems particularly interested in their traditional religious feelings. The entire passage from 2.13 to 2.16 perhaps loses some of its force if, three years before, the inhabitants of Athens and Attica had watched the treasures of their gods hauled away to the Akropolis in expectation of, and in preparation for, war.

Perikles' speech), the date originally proposed by Bannier, is the most likely date for the removal of the sacred treasures of the local gods, and thus for decree A.⁷⁹

Thucydides' comment in 1.44.2 about the expectation of war only demonstrates well the difference between accepting and acting on a probability; the move to concentrate the treasures likely came at the last possible moment.⁸⁰ As Fornara notes, 'special stress alone will explain a resolve by Boule and Demos which must have jarred on the local patriotism of the people who had revered and made donation to particular shrines, as well as of the priests and treasurers themselves'.⁸¹ I would not, however, restrict the 'special stress' to fears of a Spartan invasion, as do Fornara and others, but would expand it to include especially the financial exigencies of the war that was now upon the Athenians. Perikles' emphasis on Athens' financial resources in 2.13 reflects his fundamental understanding of the extraordinary expenditure required for Athens both to win a war through her navy, and to maintain naval superiority in general. To meet the anticipated expense of the coming war, the crucial factor was not so much the steady influx of revenue itself as the accumulation of a vast reserve capable of sustaining such expense over a long duration.⁸² It is significant that Perikles opens his exhortation to the Athenians at the outbreak of war by dwelling on their financial status with specifics and fine detail. Centralizing the local treasures of the gods will have increased the capital on the Akropolis, thereby also rendering immediately accessible as much as possible of Athens' total reserve. This would have been in the forefront of Perikles' considerations. The measure therefore accords well with what we know of Perikles' concern to build up Athens' financial reserves at the outset of war.

In this context, another feature of Periklean financial strategy may be discernible. In the beginning of decree A appears the precondition for the decision to pay back 'the Gods': ἀποδόναι τοῖς θεοῖς | [τὰ] χρήματα τὰ ὀφελόμενα, ἐπειδὴ τῇ Ἀθηναίᾳ τὰ τρισχίλια τάλαντ[ι] ἀνερένγκται ἐς πόλιν, ἧ ἔφσέφιστο, νομίσματος ἡμεδαπῶ (lines 3–4). Whatever the composition of these 3000 talents for Athena, and the circumstances of their collection, it is clear that the prior decision to increase Athena's treasury reflects as well Perikles' close attention to the need not only to ensure the regular influx of revenue but to build up and maintain a substantial capital reserve.⁸³ In fact, the 3000 talents for Athena in decree A will have comprised a good

⁷⁹ Bannier, art. cit. 184–202; of course 431 is the date when those who argued for a later post-Archidamian war date for the decrees believed that the concentration of the treasures would naturally have occurred, e.g. Wade-Gery, art. cit. (1931), 67, before he changed his mind in favour of 434; Mattingly, art. cit.; Fornara, art. cit.

⁸⁰ I agree fully that the decree itself contains absolutely no sense of impending crisis; for the contrary view, cf. Woodhead, op. cit., p. 383.

⁸¹ Art. cit. 487.

⁸² Cf. also Perikles' comments in Thuc. 1.141.3–5, 142.1. The enormous expense which the Peloponnesian war would entail and therefore the need not only for a regular source of capital but more so for reserves were points which the perspicacious Archidamos recognized as well, Thuc. 1.83.2; cf. also 1.80.3–4, 81.4, 82.1, 83.2.

⁸³ The date of this vote, and the source(s) and nature of the amount, are unknown, and therefore, a fertile field for hypothesis. The editors of *ATL* worked out an elaborate reconstruction, linking together several important and highly problematic documents, of which the Kallias decree, necessarily dated to 434/3, was the linchpin. They argued that the Hellenotamiai made an annual grant of tribute to the treasury of Athena over a period of 15 years, beginning in 449 and ending in 434, when a total of 3000 talents was achieved (op. cit. iii.326–8). This reconstruction was based partly on the inference, erroneous in my opinion, that the Hellenotamiai had to have been the source of the 3000 talents in the Kallias decree because they are the only paymasters specified in the beginning of the decree, and partly on their interpretation of the so-called Papyrus Decree, for the fullest treatment of which see H. T.

half of the 6000 talents of reserve on the Akropolis estimated by Perikles (Thuc. 2.13.3).

After his exhortation, Perikles urged the Athenians to move into the city from the countryside. The treasures from the local shrines and temples would likely have been moved then as well. The Kallias decree made arrangements for the counting, weighing, and final placement of the treasures in their permanent home, the Opisthodomos, and for the election of the new tamiai to oversee the property.

Perhaps no date for the Kallias decree can ever be proved with certitude, and I cannot claim this for my date of 431. It is, in my opinion, easily the most probable date; it may even be correct. But even if it is rejected, still the essential case may remain, that the argument that the Kallias decree must belong in 434/3 is extremely weak. On both historical and strictly epigraphic grounds it possesses insufficient justification. Furthermore, the decree should be considered on its own on the issue of both date and content, and not in conjunction with decree B.⁸⁴ The historical

Wade-Gery, B. D. Meritt, 'Athenian Resources', *Hesperia* 26 (1957), 163–97. I argue elsewhere (see 'Did Tribute Fund the Parthenon?', *CA* 8 [1989]) that this view rests on exceedingly tenuous grounds and lacks direct evidence. Most important for our purposes, if the Kallias decree does not date to 434/3, their reconstruction is untenable, including for example the hypothesis that the Hellenotamiai had no reserves of their own, because they had systematically turned over the annual tribute surplus to the treasurers of Athena.

There must be another explanation for the 3000 talents, but any attempt to provide one will be necessarily speculative. In this spirit, *exempli gratia*, I offer one of my own in order to show that other conjectures besides *ATL*'s are possible. First, it is reasonable to suppose that the initial decision to increase Athena's treasury by 3000 talents was taken some years before (unless the 3000 talents were one lump sum transferred from one treasury off the Akropolis, i.e. the Demosion), since the sum is substantial. A plausible time for such a decision may have been shortly after the conclusion of the Samian war (440–39), quite a costly venture, amounting to some 1200 talents at least (*IG* i³.363), paid for from the funds of the treasury of Athena. This came on the heels of a difficult decade for Athens of revolt and disaffection among her allies. In addition, Athena's treasury was the chief contributor to the building programme (from what is extant: for the Parthenon, *IG* i³.437, 439, 440, 442, 444, 449 [though entirely or partly restored]; for the Propylaia, *IG* i³.463, 465, 466?). I suggest that the need to replenish the state reserves in order to face further imperial challenges thus became manifest and enabled Perikles to convince the Athenians of the priority of augmenting Athens' treasury by 3000 talents. (It is interesting that Athena's treasury apparently did not contribute to the Parthenon from 438 to 434, possibly suggesting that the need to replenish the treasury took priority; there are, of course, other possible explanations.) The relatively quiet years of the early to mid 430s will have allowed this sum to be achieved by 431, at which time repayment to 'the Gods' could commence. I see no reason why the 3000 talents could not have come from a number of sources, both domestic and imperial, and not solely tribute. But it would be foolhardy and misleading to pretend that a convincing explanation for the 3000 talents is ready at hand, since we possess not a single piece of evidence in the mire of pre-Peloponnesian war public finance in Athens that could answer this specific question, and we are reliant upon conjecture and inference.

⁸⁴ Where does this leave the date of decree B? As mentioned above (n. 36), it is not possible to treat this question here, but a few comments can be made. First, decree B should come after decree A, since it contains the 'later' term, *οἱ ἄλλοι θεοί* (cf. above, pp. 96, 107–108); and it cannot date before the treasury of the Other Gods was established, i.e. possibly 430, certainly 429. If the decrees are in fact related in content to the extent that the sum of money in decree A voted for repayment, or payment on the alternative view (cf. above, pp. 103–104), was the amount specified in decree B (line 22), then the latter should perhaps not be much later than decree A; 430 in that case is a likely choice. If the decrees are not so related, the later dates proposed for both decrees remain possible for decree B: of the two candidates proposed, 418 perhaps more so, because of the appearance of a vote of *ἀδεια* in that year (*IG* i³.370) (although not until the second prytany), a procedure prescribed in decree B. The Greater Panathenaic dates 426/5, 422/1, and 418/17 would follow the date when, according to Thucydides 3.19.1, an *eisphora* was first instituted, i.e. 427, a measure to which decree B alludes twice (lines 17, 19), in both cases, however, partially restored. (A possible reference to *eisphora* in *IG* i³.41, line 58, concerning the

importance of casting doubt on the traditional date of 434/3 is that we cannot maintain that the Athenians in 434/3 had resigned themselves to an inevitable war with Sparta, and had begun preparations in defence.⁸⁵

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Hestiaians does not, in my view, affect Thucydides' comment since there is no suggestion that the tax applied to Athenians. I agree with Sealey, 'The Tetralogies Ascribed to Antiphon', *TAPA* 114 [1984], 77–80, that Thucydides means the debut of *eisphora* and not the first *during the war*, or the first to bring in 200 talents, as J. G. Griffith, 'A Note on the First Eisphora at Athens', *AJAH* 2 [1977], 3–7, has recently argued. Of great relevance here is that the suggestion, that Thucydides meant that, although *eisphorai* had been introduced long before, only in 428 did they collect as much as 200 talents, was *only* prompted by the belief that the Kallias Decrees, or, more specifically, the second decree, dated to 434, contradicted Thucydides.) If one finds convincing the possible appearance of *eisphora* in decree B, then there is some support for a post-427 date for decree B. It is important, however, to keep in mind one significant difference between this decree (and others) and Thucydides' *History*: the former only provides a record of a decision; but the latter attempts to inform us of what actually happened. An apparent reference in B (line 3) to the Propylaia suggests an early no more than a later date: on the usual interpretation, the decree provided for its completion (*παντελός*, line 4); since this never happened, this reference is of quite uncertain value in dating the decree.

⁸⁵ The ideas and arguments presented here originated in a paper written for Professor R. S. Stroud's seminar on Greek epigraphy at Berkeley, and were developed and offered in brief form in an appendix to my doctoral dissertation and in a talk given at the 1987 Annual Meeting of the APA. Special thanks are due to Professor Stroud for many discussions, general encouragement, and comments on earlier drafts. I also thank Professors R. Sealey, E. S. Gruen, and M. Ostwald for reading and commenting on previous versions. To the anonymous referee of *CQ* are due considerable improvements of content. I thank Professor R. M. Kallet-Marx for his editorial expertise at the final stage of preparation, and for examining *IG* i³.52B with me. None of the above should be presumed to agree with my arguments and conclusions.